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Privacy is always one of the primary concerns in electronic 
commerce.  Consumers must have the right to keep their 
buying habits and personal information confidential, 
especially when it comes to on-line credit card payment. Not 
just only because this payment method has been becoming 
the trend of modern consuming practice, but also it involves 
the sensitivity of privacy information.  Based on the 
need-to-know principle, transaction information should be 
distributed properly among participants to be against 
aggregation and analysis.  In this paper, the privacy 
required for on-line credit card payment is described, and 
the privacy protection on three common payment protocols  
such as SSL, SET and 3D SET are also analyzed in detail.  
Two solutions are then proposed to enhance privacy 
protection for cardholders. 





Privacy has been a critical concern long there before the 
advent of computers.  As computer technologies advance 
and the popularity of Internet grows, personal information 
could be recorded, collected, gathered, and analyzed easier 
than ever.  Privacy protection is therefore becoming an 
important issue in the cyber era.  In a fraud research led by 
CyberSource [1], consumers’ fraud concerns negatively 
impact their on-line shopping demand.  The loss of 
customer goodwill is ranked as the major negative impact for 
on-line merchant sales.  According to the American 
National Consumers League survey conducted by Opinion 
Research Corporation International [2], most consumers 
prefer to pay on-line orders with credit cards (67%), while 
the greatest concern was that their credit card numbers 
would be stolen if they provided the information on-line 
(41%).   Twenty-four percent of the survey respondents 
ranked the abuse of their personal information as their 
greatest concern on on-line commerce.  In another fraud 
research by CyberSource for UK [3], total credit card 
security and the guarantee of keeping one’s personal 
information private in any on-line transaction process, as 
 
 
well as protection against unauthorized access to customer 
information in particular, are shown to be the major concerns 
of consumers.  Therefore, building up customers’ 
confidence in on-line credit card payment weighs great 
importance to the development of electronic commerce.   
With a growing scale of wide acceptance and a mature 
business operation infrastructure, payment by credit card 
has been a major payment method in the physical world. 
This method has been commonly applied on-line, but still 
lack of cardholders’ confidence.  In order to help build up 
consumers’ confidence in on-line credit card payment for 
the booming electronic commerce, privacy protection for 
customers is in great need to be enhanced.  Taking 
advantage of its convenience, SSL has become the most 
commonly used protocol for on-line credit card payment 
nowadays, but only the confidentiality and the integrity of 
information data between cardholders and merchants are 
secured.  Unscrupulous merchants can steal cardholders’ 
credit card information that contains the key elements 
needed to counterfeit credit cards and/or to initiate 
fraudulent transactions.  SET [4][5][6], the secure electronic 
transaction protocol proposed by VISA International and 
MasterCard International, is deemed to be a de facto 
standard, but gains little acceptance due to its complication 
and high cost.  Additionally, banks can aggregate 
cardholders’ transaction data for further analysis [7].  
Recently the successor of SET, 3D SET [8], is proposed to 
improve the portability and the flexibility for cardholders to 
pay on-line.  The core protocol of 3D SET is the same as 
SET, but all transaction detail and history of the cardholder 
are stored at the bank that infringes the right of cardholders 
on the matter of privacy protection.  Banks have long been 
trusted by cardholders; however, negative impacts such as 
branch closure programs, poor customer services and 
security problems with Internet banking are all undermining 
customers’ trust in banks. 
In this paper, we first examine the privacy needed by the 
on-line credit card payment, and then analyze the privacy 
protection on the major protocols.  Based on the 
need-to-know principle, two methods are proposed to 
improve the privacy protection. 
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THE TRANSACTION MODEL OF CREDIT 
CARD PAYMENT 
 
In this brick-and-mortar world, there are four roles involved 
in the transaction model of credit card payment.  The issuer 
is a financial institution that issues a credit card to the 
cardholder.  The acquirer is a financial institution that 
processes authentication and payments for the merchant.  
When a cardholder intends to buy something at a 
merchant’s place and wishes to pay by credit card, the flow 
of a transaction is described as follows: 
1. The cardholder presents his/her credit card and signs a 
purchase order to the merchant. 
2. The merchant sends an authorization request to the 
issuer via the acquirer. 
3. After verifying the status of the credit card, the is suer 
sends an authorization response back to the merchant to 
assure the merchant of the payment. 
4. If the transaction is authorized, the merchant then fulfills 
the order (e.g., by giving goods) and gives the 
cardholder a copy of the purchase order; or the order is 
rejected. 
To pay on-line by credit card, the business process 
resembles that of mail order or telephone order.  Based on 
the need-to-know principle, the following requirements 
should be considered to enhance privacy protection for 
cardholders. 
 Only the cardholder and the issuer know the credit card 
number. 
 Only the cardholder and the merchant know the order 
information. 
 The issuer should not know which merchant the 
cardholder deals with. 
 





Originally developed by Netscape, SSL has been universally 
accepted on the World Wide Web for authenticated and 
encrypted communication between clients and servers.  
The SSL Protocol is designed to provide a private and 
reliable channel between two communicating entities.  This 
protocol has the lowest level SSL Record Protocol for 
encapsulation of higher level protocols.  One such 
encapsulated protocol, the SSL Handshake Protocol, allows 
the server and the client to perform mutual authentication 
and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic 
keys before the application protocol transmits or receives 
information.  One advantage of SSL is that it is 
independent of application protocols.  The application 
designers and users have no need to consider the 
implementation details of SSL. 
Although SSL has been a widely accepted security protocol, 
it is still not the best choice for consumers in the sense of 
privacy protection.  SSL does establish a perfectly secure 
channel between the consumer and the merchant; it cannot, 
however, protect the consumer from the merchant’s 
malicious aggregation of transaction information and, even 
the worse, credit card counterfeits and fraudulent 
transactions.  Hence, making transactions on-line with 
straightforward SSL encryption/decryption does not fully 















Establish security capabilit ies,  
including protocol version, session 
ID,  cipher sui te ,  compression 
method,  and random numbers .
Client sends certificate if requested.
Change cipher suite and finish 
handshake protocol. 
* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent
 




SET, jointly developed by VISA, MasterCard, IBM, GTE, 
Microsoft, Netscape, etc., is a security paradigm for on-line 
credit card payment.  A payment gateway, a device 
operated by an acquirer or a third party that processes 
merchant payment messages, is defined in SET 
specification.  We do not distinguish between the payment 
gateway and the acquirer here.  SET uses public key 
encryption/decryption to provide the confidentiality of 
payment information and to ensure payment integrity.  It 
uses digital signatures to authenticate all parties involved in 
the payment process, including the cardholder, the 
merchant, and the acquirer to ensure entity legitimacy prior 
to the transaction.  To protect the cardholder’s privacy, the 
payment information including the credit card number is 
protected from the merchant.  If a cardholder intends to 
initiate an on-line payment after picking items to be 
purchased from the merchant’s web site or electronic 
catalogs, the following main steps are taken: 
1. The cardholder’s electronic wallet generates a purchase 
request including the Order Information (OI) and the 
Payment Instruction (PI), which are signed by the 
cardholder’s private key as a dual signature.  OI is for 
the merchant; while PI, protected by a digital envelope 
encrypted with the acquirer’s public key, is for the 
acquirer. 
2. After receiving the purchase request from the 
cardholder, the merchant generates an authorization 
request (AUTH REQ), which includes the amount to be 
authorized, and then transmits the request along with PI 
to the acquirer. 
3. The acquirer examines the validity of the merchant’s 
authorization request and the cardholder’s PI by 
verifying the signatures and ensures the consistency of 
the two messages.  The acquirer then sends an 
authorization request, including credit card information 
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and transaction amount, through a financial network to 
the issuer. 
4. After ensuring that the credit card is not stolen, revoked 
or over its credit limit, the issuer authorizes the 
transaction and sends the authorization response to the 
merchant via the acquirer. 
5. The merchant transmits a purchase response to the 

















I:   Issuer
Sx(M): signature on M with X ’s private key
DSx(M): Dual signature on M with X ’s private key
ENVx(M): M is encrypted by a session key which 
is encrypted with X ’s private key
5.Purchase response
 Figure 2.  The payment authorization using SET 
 
However, the acquirer receives unnecessary access to the 
consumer’s payment information while it only needs to get 
the authorization response from the issuer.  This situation 
violates the basic privacy requirement mentioned in the 
previous section.  The same problem occurs when the 
issuer knows which merchant the consumer makes his/her 
transaction with; it just needs to verify the consumer’s 
digital signature on payment information. 
Hwang and Hsueh proposed a revised SET protocol [7] 
using the credit card certificate – an anonymous surrogate 
for the credit card – to conceal the cardholder’s credit card 
number in the electronic marketplace.  This revision also 
uses transaction IDs to allow the cardholder generates 
his/her monthly statement by linking payment details  
provided by the issuer and the information stored in E-wallet 




VISA introduced a three-domain model (3D SET) in August 
1999.  Visa EU has mandated its member banks to adopt 3D 
SET by October 2001.  Minimum standards are set, and the 
issuer and the acquirer are free to determine security and 
authentication schemes for their own cardholders and 
merchants respectively.  The 3D SET [8] looks at the 
activity between the following parties: 
 The merchant and their bank – Acquirer Domain 
 The cardholder and their bank – Issuer Domain 
 The cardholder’s bank and the merchant’s bank – 
Interoperability Domain 
SET was too complicated and too costly to be successfully 
carried out.  A Cardholder needs to install E-wallet and to 
apply for a certificate on his/her PC.  To increase the 
convenience for the cardholder, the function of E-wallet is 
divided into a centralized “server side wallet” engine 
residing at the issuer and a light-weight, easy-to-download 
wallet interface on the cardholder’s device.  Through the 
wallet interface, an authenticated cardholder can access 
his/her server side wallet to pay on-line by credit card.  Due 
to the low computation demand of the client side, either a 
PC, a WAP mobile phone, or a digital TV can be used as the 
cardholder’s Internet access device. Similarly, through the 
merchant server interface, the merchant can be 
authenticated and then access his/her server side merchant 
server.  Merchants using 3D SET to authenticate 
consumers – by accepting payments from bank-issued 












Figure 3.  The 3D SET model 
 
Basically, 3D SET is working on a basis that all banks are 
trustworthy.  The transaction information is primarily 
recorded and maintained by the issuer and the acquirer.  
Hence in comparison to the original SET, 3D SET enhances 
the responsibility of banks.  If the transaction information 
can be protected from any malicious intention of 
aggregation by an individual party, the cardholder’s privacy 
can be secured even under the assumption that banks are 
not always reliable. 
 
OUR PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
As none of the three protocols stated above can fully 
secure consumer privacy, this paper proposes two revisions 
on the original SET protocol. 
 
Solution 1  
 
The major concept in this solution is that PI here is not 
verified by the acquirer, but the issuer instead.  The PI in a 
purchase request is protected by the digital envelope, which 
is made by the issuer’s public key.  The verifications of the 
credit card certificate and the digital signature are now the 
duties on the issuer.  Once the issuer authenticates the 
customer’s signature in PI, equivalently it means  the 
customer’s agreement to pay for the corresponding 
transaction.  With this, the issuer will no longer need to 
know which merchant the customer is dealing with.  Hence 
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the merchant ID can be accordingly removed from PI.  The 
acquirer may link the authorization response and the 
authorization request together by transaction IDs to ask for 
redemption 
Herein the detailed transaction flow, shown in Fig.4, is 
described as below: 
1. The purchase request transmitted from the cardholder 
to the merchant includes PI and OI, which are signed by 
the cardholder’s private key as a dual signature.  PI is 
also protected by a digital envelope made by the issuer 
to prevent the merchant or the acquirer from knowing 
the cardholder’s sensitive card information. 
2. The merchant first authenticates the cardholder’s 
digital signature in OI.  If valid, it then generates and 
signs the authorization request (AUTH REQ).  This 
signed information is then sent out to the acquirer 
altogether with the PI from the cardholder. 
3. The acquirer verifies the validity of the merchant 
certificate, and examines the signature signed on AUTH 
REQ.  The acquirer may request for authorization from 
the issuer with the authorization request and PI via the 
bank net or the Internet. 
4. After receiving, the issuer obtains PI with its private 
key and authenticates the cardholder’s signature on PI.  
By confirming the consistency of the authorization 
request and PI, the issuer notifies the merchant the 
authorization decision via the acquirer. 
5. The merchant generates a purchase response based on 
the received authorization response.  The cardholder 
















I:   Issuer
Sx(M): signature on M with X’s private key
DSx(M): Dual signature on M with X’s private key
ENVx(M): M is encrypted by a session key which 









In the original SET, sensitive credit card information, 
including the card number, the expiry date, etc., are recorded 
as a hashed value  rather than plaintext  on the 
cardholder’s certificate.  When the acquirer needs to verify 
the cardholder’s signature in PI, it first extracts the credit 
card information from PI, and then computes the hash value 
of credit card information and compares the result with the 
subject name recorded in the cardholder’s certificate. 
In this scenario, the cardholder’s sensitive information is 
exposed at the acquirer’s place, and it may possibly cause 
unexpected loss from the cardholder’s point of view.  
Hence we propose a revision of SET to protect cardholders 
from such losses. 
The authenticity of 
this certificate is 
guaranteed by the 
d i g i t a l  s i g n a tu r e




Subject Name: 8098 3865 2834 0032




card information are 
recorded in this 
certificate with two 
t i m e s  o f  h a s h  
c o m p u t a t i o n .
Figure 5.  An illustration of a SET certificate 
 
We herein suggest that the cardholder’s credit card 
information is recorded in the certificate after two times of 
hash computation instead of one.  If it is H2(credit card 
information) stored in the certificate, only H(credit card 
information) has to be shown in PI.  By verifying the 
consistency between the certificate and PI, the acquirer still 
can verifies the card information without knowing the 
cardholder’s detail in this case.  Hence the cardholder’s 
detail information is only known to the issuer and the 
cardholder.  This meets the basic privacy requirement in 






SSL encrypts the link between the cardholder and the 
merchant to provide confidentiality and integrity of 
transmitted card information.  It is inadequate because it 
protects transaction details only when it is in the 
transmission channel;  once the information has arrived at 
the web site, it will be decrypted to plain text which  leaves 
no ways to prevent any kind of frauds.  Some malicious 
merchants may use the cardholder’s credit card information 
that provides the key element needed to counterfeit cards 




SET has the following shortcomings. 
1. The issuer has to trust the acquirer’s verification about 
the cardholder’s signature on PI.  After sending the 
authorization response to the merchant via the acquirer, 
the issuer guarantees the merchant for the payment.  
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Bearing the risk of false payment, the issuer should 
validate that whether PI is indeed signed by the 
cardholder to commit the payment.  However, the 
cardholder’s signature is verified by the acquirer 
instead.  Hence in the original SET, the issuer has to 
rely on the trust relationship with the acquirer 
completely. 
2. The cardholder’s credit card number is revealed to the 
acquirer.  It is the issuer that decides whether the 
payment is approved or not.  The acquirer simply 
forwards the authorization response received from the 
issuer to the merchant.  The acquirer does not need to 
know the cardholder’s card information to perform its 
function. 
3. The issuer knows all merchants whom the consumer has 




Credit card number can be sealed from the acquirer using 
pseudo card number assigned by the issuer.  However, 
server side wallet resided at the issuer routes purchase 
requests from the cardholder, and communicates with other 
SET components (merchant, acquirer and CA).  It stores 
the cardholder’s private key, certificate, account 
information, purchase transaction detail and history.  The 
cardholder’s buying habit can thus be aggregated and 
analyzed.  Moreover, the acquirer manages server side 
merchant server for merchants.  Both PI and OI are open to 
the acquirer. 
Namely, 3D SET reduces the loading of the cardholder and 
the merchant, trying to fit in the newly emerged environment 
of mobile transactions.  The merchant no longer needs to 
set up a merchant server to participate in this architecture.  
To the contrary, 3D SET increases the loading of banks, and 
removes the right of the cardholder and the merchant to 
control their individual information.  Such scenario is a 
negative impact on the issue of privacy protection. 
 
The proposed methods  
 
Our two revisions on SET are discussed respectively as the 
followings: 
Method 1. 
1. The cardholder’s credit card number is concealed from 
the acquirer.  It is the is suer to decide whether this 
transaction is approved.  The acquirer only forward 
encrypted PI received from the cardholder via merchant 
to the issuer for verification and credit card status 
checking.  After receiving the authorization response 
from the issuer, the acquirer returns it back to the 
merchant.  Because the acquirer cannot decrypt the 
encrypted PI, the cardholder’s credit card number is 
protected from the acquirer. 
2. The issuer keeps non-repudiation evidence by itself for 
future dispute solving.   Cardholder’s signature on PI 
represents cardholder’s authorization on this payment, 
it is the only evidence that the issuer needs to hold 
against cardholder’s repudiation.  
3. The issuer does not know which merchant the 
cardholder deal with. 
4. The increased efficiency by simplifying the certificate 
verification process.  On-line payment involves money 
transfer.  Strict certificate verification, including 
certificate chain setting and CRL check, is needed to 
authenticate participants.  Many complicated certificate 
verifications are needed in a transaction using SET, the 
cardholder need to verify the acquirer’s certificate by 
traversing the trust chain to the root key to get the 
acquirer’s public key for encrypting the digital envelop 
of PI.  The acquirer also has to validate the 
cardholder’s certificate by traversing the trust chain to 
the root key and check revocation status to get the 
cardholder’s valid public key for verifying the 
cardholder’s signature on PI.  Because no existing trust 
is built up between the cardholder and the acquirer, the 
complex mutual certificate verification must be done 
carefully to avoid dispute.  In the proposed method, 
using the existing trust relationship built between the 
cardholder and the issuer, PI is verified by the is suer, not 
the acquirer, to simplify the certificate verification and 
reduce potential risk. 
Method 2. 
We suggest that the cardholder’s sensitive information 
should be stored in the certificate after two times of hash 
computation.  In that case, only hashed credit card 
information, H(credit card information), has to be recorded in 
PI, and the acquirer may verify the validity of the credit card 
without knowing the detail information of the cardholder.  
The cardholder’s privacy is thus secured. 
Recording twice-hashed credit card information in the 
cardholder’s certificate may raise some security concerns.  
Due to the characteristics of hash function, the possibility 
of collision may increases, which means that different 
cardholders may have exactly the same hashed information 
recorded on their certificate.  This case reduces the 
authenticity of cardholders.  The serial number of a 
cardholder certificate can be concatenated as part of the 
input of the second hash computation.  This unique 




Credit card is a popular mean for customers to pay on-line.  
However, the privacy protection issue poses a major 
concern to most customers.  To encourage the 
development of electronic commerce, privacy protection 
mechanisms  should be improved to build up consumers’ 
confidence.  In this paper, we summarize the requirements 
for protecting cardholders’ privacy, analyze the privacy 
protection on three common payment protocols, such as 
SSL, SET and 3D SET, and propose two methods to enhance 
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